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INTRODUCTION

Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in the field of
criminal procedure make it clear that state law in this area is recovering some of the status it has lost over the last three decades.
Given the Supreme Court's current reluctance to extend the rights
of criminal defendants under federal law, prosecutors and defense
attorneys are likely to find themselves arguing more state procedural and constitutional law in the future. Whatever direction the
development of the law takes in Montana, one thing is clear: state
cases will assume a new importance as precedents. This survey examines selected cases in the field of criminal procedure decided by
the Montana Supreme Court in 1983 and early 1984.
II.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A.

Probable Cause

Under the fourth amendment,1 a finding of probable cause is
prerequisite to a magistrate's issuance of a search or arrest warrant. Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1984

1

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 45REVIEW
[1984], Iss. 2, Art. 9
MONTANA

[Vol. 45

Gates2 repudiated the technicalities presented by the previously
required Aguilar-Spinelli test,8 and adopted instead a "totality of
circumstances" test. The Montana Supreme Court, in State v.
Erler,' analyzed the Aguilar-Spinelli and Gates tests and applied
both to the case.
In the past, courts applied the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
test when determining probable cause based solely on an informant's information. That test required the authority requesting the
warrant to inform the magistrate of (1) some of the underlying circumstances supporting the informant's credibility, and (2) some of
the underlying circumstances providing a basis for the informant's
conclusions.' Over time, this two-prong test was perceived as being
encumbered with numerous "separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. ' The "totality of circumstances" test was adopted in Gates to reestablish a more traditional, common-sense approach to determining probable cause.
Under Gates, the Aguilar-Spinelli factors are still considered, but
the magistrate issuing the warrant is "simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him.

. .

there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.

17

In Erler law enforcement officers received a tip from an informant who had provided reliable information three times in the
past. The informant described a car of a certain make with a specific license number that would be making a trip into Lewis and
Clark County with drugs. Officers corroborated the informant's tip
by subsequent investigation. Based on the corroborated information, officers obtained a search warrant, and the resulting search
produced cash, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other controlled substances. Holding that the search was valid under both
the Aguilar-Spinelli test and the Gates test, the court implied that
Gates may be the appropriate standard for future determinations
of probable cause. 8
2.
3.

103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
4. Mont. -,
672 P.2d 624 (1983).
5. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
6. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28.
7.
8.

Id. at 2332.
Erler, Mont. at

-,

672 P.2d at 627.
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B. Expectation of Privacy
To give rise to fourth amendment protections, a search must
intrude upon a person's justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy. Generally, a person has no expectation of privacy in objects
or activities held out to the public.9 In State v. Bennett,0 the supreme court further restricted a person's justifiable or reasonable
expectation of privacy by approving the use of a spotting scope to
enhance a law enforcement officer's natural senses.
The defendant in Bennett was convicted for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal he sought to suppress evidence
of his cultivation of marijuana in an open field surrounded by corn
and a barbed wire fence. The arresting officer saw the marijuana
with the aid of a spotting scope while standing on the county road
adjoining the field. The court held that the defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy because he had voluntarily exposed
the marijuana to public view by growing it in an open field." Further, the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy, based on
planting corn around the marijuana, was not one society would recognize as reasonable; therefore there was no search or seizure
within the fourth amendment. 2
In deciding Bennett, the Montana court adopted the test from
the recently decided United States v. Knotts." In Knotts the
Court stated, "Visual surveillance from public places. . . adjoining
[defendant's] premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these
facts to the police. . . . Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting [their] sensory faculties . , *
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in
this case."' 4 The Bennett court found the spotting scope to be one
such acceptable enhancement of an officer's sensory faculties. 5
C.

Custodial Arrests

There is a growing body of authority supporting the view that
use of full custodial arrests should be more limited, with an increased use of summonses and notices to appear. Montana appeared to be following that trend with decisions disapproving the
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
10. Mont. -,
666 P.2d 747 (1983).
11. Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 750.
12. Id.
13. 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (holding that the use of a "beeper" to track automobiles did
not constitute a search under the fourth amendment).
14. Id. at 1086.
15. Bennett, Mont. at -,
666 P.2d at 749.
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use of full custodial arrests 6 and suppressing evidence seized incident to full custodial arrest when less intrusive means were available.1" The court grounded these decisions on the state constitutional protection of privacy in Montana.18 In State v. Wood,19
however, the court signaled that its support for limiting the use of
full custodial arrests was not unqualified and that custodial arrests
may be reasonable for all but minor traffic-related misdemeanors.
The defendant in Wood was arrested at his home for issuing
bad checks. In two separate two-week periods, the defendant issued thirteen checks, totalling $231.76, which were returned to the
payees for insufficient funds in the defendant's account. The payees never contacted the defendant. A justice of the peace issued a
warrant for the defendant's arrest although there had been no
prior efforts to secure his appearance. The arrest warrant provided
for a reasonable bond, but the officer made no offer to accept bond;
nor was a summons or notice to appear issued in lieu of the warrant for full custodial arrest. During the defendant's booking at the
police station, officers made a full search of the defendant and discovered one gram of hashish in his possession. The defendant
pleaded guilty to the bad check charges.
The trial court, relying on State v. Carlson,'0 suppressed the
drug evidence, finding that it was obtained by an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy and that the state had failed to show a compelling interest for using such an intrusive procedure.2 In Carlson,
the court suppressed evidence of more serious drug-related offenses observed by officers when they came to the defendant's
home early in the morning to arrest him for failing to appear on
two traffic citations that had never been mailed to him. The Carlson court emphasized that there was no prior justification for an
intrusion into the privacy of the defendant when a search was not
necessary to insure that he would not obtain a weapon, destroy
evidence of the crimes with which he was charged, or escape, and
when several less intrusive alternative means of securing the defendant's appearance were available."2 Wood presented a similar factual situation.
16. State v. Jetty, 176 Mont. 519, 579 P.2d 1228 (1978) (full custodial arrest for a
minor traffic violation unreasonable).
17. State v. Carlson, Mont. -,
644 P.2d 498 (1982).
18. MONT. CONST. art. H, § 10. For a lengthy discussion of the state constitutional
provision, see State v. Hyem, Mont. -,
630 P.2d 202 (1981).
19. Mont.
, 666 P.2d 753 (1983).
20. Mont. -,
644 P.2d 498 (1982).
21. Wood, - Mont. at -,
666 P.2d at 754.
22. Carlson, Mont. at , 644 P.2d at 504-05.
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Stressing that the underlying offense in Wood was a felony,
the supreme court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the
evidence and held that the full custody arrest of the defendant was
not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.2" The court stated that
apprehending felons is a compelling state interest and ruled that
felony arrests supported by warrants are proper.2 ' The court then
explicitly limited its Carlson holding, that a full custodial arrest is
unreasonable when there is no exigency justifying such intrusive
means, to traffic-related misdemeanor cases. State v. Jetty,25 relied
on in Carlson and also involving a minor traffic offense, presumably is similarly limited, indicating that full custody arrests may always be appropriate for offenses other than minor traffic
violations.
III.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

A.

Custodial Interrogation

A Miranda warning is required only if questions are asked
during custodial interrogation.2" Whether police conduct amounted
to custodial interrogation is thus often critical for determining the
admissibility of evidence. Custodial interrogation generally is
found when "a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 2' 7 In
State v. Lapp2a the Montana court adopted a more precise test for
determining the parameters of this definition.
Lapp was convicted of negligent homicide following a two-car
collision in which the driver of the other vehicle died. Following
the accident, the defendant was taken to the hospital before the
highway patrol arrived. When the investigating officer completed
his work at the accident scene, he went to the hospital and interviewed the defendant in the emergency room in the presence of
two nurses. The officer did not read the defendant his Miranda
warning, nor did he place the defendant under arrest. He asked the
defendant only his name, birthdate, and whether he had been driving. In response, the defendant gave the officer his name and
birthdate, stated that he was the driver, that the accident was "all
his fault," and that "they could do anything they wanted to" with
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Wood, Mont. at -,
666 P.2d at 754.
Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 755.
176 Mont. 519, 579 P.2d 1228 (1978).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id.
- Mont. -, 658 P.2d 400 (1983).
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him.29 These statements were admitted into evidence at trial. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the statements were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial interrogation and
were not preceded by a Miranda warning.
Whether a Miranda warning is required turns on when questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers, and whether it is
then a custodial interrogation. In Oregon v. Mathiason'0 the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the language "otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way" to mean that a
warning is required only when there has been "such a restriction
on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' "31 The Montana court adopted this interpretation in 1981, in State v.
Graves.'2
In Lapp, the supreme court addressed the degree of restriction
on a defendant's freedom that finally renders him "in custody"
and adopted the determining factors set out in a Maryland case."
The factors include (1) place of interrogation, (2) time of interrogation, (3) persons present during interrogation, (4) whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given, (5) the length and mood
of the interrogation, and (6) whether the defendant was arrested
following the interrogation. 4 Applying these factors to Lapp and
noting that the majority of cases involving in-hospital questioning
do not amount to a significant deprivation of freedom,", the court
held that the defendant in this case was not in custody at the time
of questioning and, therefore, the failure to give a Miranda warning did not make the defendant's statements inadmissible."a The
factors provide a more precise foundation for a custody status
sometimes difficult to define.
29.

Id. at

-,

658 P.2d at 402.

30. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
31. Id. at 495.
32. Mont. , 622 P.2d 203, 207 (1981). See also State v. Dupre, Mont.
-,
650 P.2d 1381, 1384 (1982).
33. Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 341 A.2d 294 (1975).
34. Lapp, Mont. at -,
658 P.2d at 403 (citing Cummings, 27 Md. App. at 36979, 341 A.2d at 300-05).
The court also addressed the problem of "investigative focus." The defendant had argued, relying on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), that the interrogation had gone
from an investigatory stage to an accusatory stage by the time he was questioned in the
hospital. The Montana court rejected this distinction in determining whether there had
been "custodial interrogation."
35. Mont. at -,
658 P.2d at 403.
36. Id. at

-,

658 P.2d at 402.
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B. Implied Consent to Blood Alcohol Tests
1. Constitutionality
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in Montana
gives rise to civil and criminal liability and subjects a defendant to
a number of specific rules, including the driver's implied consent to
chemical tests of his blood, breath, or urine to determine blood
alcohol levels.37 In a case with potentially far-reaching constitutional implications, the court settled the constitutionality of the
implied consent statute.
The two Jackson cases (Jackson 18 and Jackson I131) involved the fourth arrest of the defendant for driving under the influence. At the police station the defendant was asked to take a
breathalyzer test, to which, by statute, he was presumed to have
consented.4 0 The defendant refused to take the test. Police recorded this refusal and various coordination tests on videotape,
and seized and suspended the defendant's driver's license, again in
accordance with statute. 41 The defendant was charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol.
At trial, the district court suppressed all evidence relating to
the defendant's refusal to take the breathalyzer test and the consequent license suspension on the ground that the implied consent
statutes permitting introduction of this type of evidence 42 were unconstitutional. In Jackson I the supreme court affirmed the order
of the district court, ruling that a defendant's refusal was testimonial evidence and that admission of the refusal into evidence would
violate his privilege against self-incrimination." The state petitioned by writ of certiorari for review of this issue by the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the Montana
court judgment4 4 and remanded the case for further consideration
in light of its decision in South Dakota v. Neville."
In Neville the Supreme Court analyzed a South Dakota statute ' substantially similar to Montana's implied consent statutes.
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1983).
38. State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Jackson 1].
39. State v. Jackson, - Mont. , 672 P.2d 255 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Jackson II].
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(1) (1983).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(3) (1981) (amended 1983).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(2) (1983).
43. Jackson I, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1.
44. Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983).
45. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).

46. S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1983).
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The Court held that fifth amendment protections against self-incrimination do not prohibit admission into evidence of a person's
refusal to take a blood alcohol sobriety test under South Dakota
law.47 The court reasoned that a defendant's refusal in response to
a lawful request to take the test is not coerced, and that if the
request to take the test is legitimate, it is no less legitimate if the
request is refused. Therefore the Court concluded that it is not
fundamentally unfair to use the defendant's refusal as evidence of
48
his guilt.

In light of Neville, the issues in Jackson I then became
whether Jackson I was based on federal or state constitutional
grounds, or both, and if not based on state grounds, whether the
decision was overruled by Neville.49 The Montana court found that

Jackson I was based on federal decisions interpreting federal fifth
amendment protection and that references to the Montana Constitution were interdependent with references to the federal Constitution.50 Because it interpreted Montana's privilege against self-incrimination51 to be substantially the same as the federal privilege,
the Montana court found no basis for a broader interpretation in
Jackson If and held that the defendant's refusal to submit to a
chemical sobriety test was admissible into evidence as provided for
by the Montana statute.
2.

Scope

The scope of the implied consent statutes was examined in
State v. Thompson.2 In Thompson the defendant was arrested at
the scene of a two-car accident for driving under the influence of
alcohol, and taken to a hospital where he refused to submit to a
blood alcohol test. Following this refusal the passenger from the
other vehicle died. On the advice of the county attorney, the arresting officer then informed the defendant that the implied consent provisions no longer applied because the case now involved
negligent homicide. The blood sample was taken and analyzed.
At trial the district court denied a motion to suppress the
47. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922-23.
48. Id. at 923.
49. Jackson H, Mont. at -,
672 P.2d at 256.
50. Id. at -,
672 P.2d at 258. See also State v. Armstrong, 170 Mont. 256, 552 P.2d
616 (1976) (holding that the state constitution provides no broader protection against selfincrimination than the federal constitution); State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119
(1977) (holding that the opinions of the United States Supreme Court define the maximum
breadth of the privilege).
51. MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 25.
52.
- Mont. -,
674 P.2d 1094 (1984).
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blood sample made on the ground that the blood sample was taken
in violation of the implied consent statute.53 The court stated that
the implied consent law did not apply to negligent homicide, that
the sample had been taken in compliance with the federal and
Montana Constitutions," and that the taking of the sample did
not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. 5
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court analyzed the suppression in light of three factors:56 (1) the plain language of the statute, 57 (2) the application of implied consent statutes in other jurisdictions, and (3) the insufficiency of license suspension as a penalty
when death is involved. The court then affirmed the district court
decision, holding that the implied consent statute does not apply
to negligent homicide cases where the results of involuntary blood
tests are admissible. 8
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION

All jurisdictions provide for pretrial discovery of prosecution
evidence under the sixth amendment requirement that a defendant be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"
against him. Suppression of prosecution evidence is a violation of
due process. The Montana law on suppression of evidence by the
prosecution is stated in State v. Craig.59 Only intentional or deliberate suppression is a per se violation of due process. The court
will overturn a conviction where there has been passive or negligent suppression only if the suppression prejudices the defendant
and is vital to his defense. Further, to support reversal, the evidence suppressed must be material to the guilt or punishment of
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at , 674 P.2d at 1095.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
Thompson, Mont. at -, 674 P.2d at 1095.
Id. at , 674 P.2d at 1096-97.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(1) (1981) (amended 1983) provided in pertinent part:

Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state
shall be deemed to have given consent ...

to a chemical test... for the purpose

of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested by a peace officer for
driving or in actualphysical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol. (emphasis added).
58. Thompson, Mont. at , 674 P.2d at 1097. The defendant based his argument on State v. Morgan, Mont. , 646 P.2d 1177 (1982), another negligent homicide case, where the court held that the defendant's injuries were serious enough to render
him incapable of refusing the blood test even though he was still conscious. The Thompson
court pointed out that the central issues in Morgan were whether the defendant was so
incoherent that consent was unnecessary and whether proper procedures were followed.
There was no issue of whether the provisions applied and the court did not rule on that
question. Thompson, -

59.

Mont. at

-

, 674 P.2d at 1096.

169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976).
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the defendant, and it must be exculpatory.60 These rules have been
applied only to prosecutors. In State v. Patterson," the court extended their application to suppression by investigators.
Pattersoninvolved the conviction of the defendant for sexual
intercourse without consent. Following the alleged rape, a police
officer interviewed the defendant three times and prepared a summary report of his interviews. In the report, the officer stated,
"[Defendant] told me that he had a lot of mental problems. That
he tends to forget things yet he is certain that he was not responsible for the rape. "62 After the trial began, the prosecution learned
that the investigator's interviews were more detailed than the report indicated, including statements by the defendant about his
problems with "smoking and the devil," denials about incidents
surrounding the rape, and references to his other mental
problems.6 s The defendant appealed his conviction based on the
prejudicial effect of the state's failure to provide the defense with a
complete summary of the investigative interviews."4 In concluding
that had the defense been aware of the defendant's remarks about
mental illness, the defendant might have pursued an insanity defense and, therefore, that the suppression was prejudicial, 6 the
court extended to investigators the prosecutorial duty to disclose
material or exculpatory evidence to the defense.
V.

GuLTY

PLEAS

Frequently a defendant's guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain. A court may not accept the guilty plea unless it is made voluntarily and understandingly,16 because by pleading guilty, the defendant waives many valuable constitutional rights.67 Negotiated
pleas are valid, however, notwithstanding the inducement of promised leniency, as long as they conform to the voluntariness and understanding standards. 8 State v. Cavanaugh" and State v.
60. Id. at 153, 545 P.2d at 651.
, 662 P.2d 291 (1983).
Mont. 61. 662 P.2d at 292.
62. Id. at -,
63. Id.
64. Id. at -,
662 P.2d at 293.
65. Id.
66. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See also MoNT.CODE ANN. § 46-12204 (1983).
67. These rights include the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,
the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Yother v. State, 182 Mont. 351, 597 P.2d 79 (1979).
68. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55.
Mont. -, 673 P.2d 482 (1983).
69. -
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Dinndorf'0 further refine the application of these requirements in
Montana.
Because under state law the trial judge is not bound by the
plea bargain, the defendant must be informed of the maximum
penalty that may be imposed as a result of his plea.7 1 In State v.
Cavanaugh the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated assault in exchange for the dismissal of two other
felony charges. The court sentenced the defendant to the maximum penalty on each offense with no eligibility for parole or supervised release (formerly prisoner furlough). As part of the plea
bargain, the defendant had been informed of the length of the
sentences but not the ineligibility- for parole or supervised release.
The supreme court held that because of the failure to inform the
defendant of the parole and supervised release restrictions, the defendant's plea had not been entered voluntarily and understandingly, and he must be allowed to withdraw it.7 2 Here the defendant

was informed of the maximum penalties that could be imposed,
but not the full consequence of his plea, and therefore the plea
bargain he thought he entered into was not the plea bargain accepted by the court.
The court based its holding on the express terms of the statute, which provides that the court may restrict parole and supervised release eligibility on any sentence exceeding a year,' and on
a fundamental fairness concept. 74 Noting that federal trial courts

are required to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea if it is not
accepted by the judge," the court prospectively adopted the American Bar Association standards relating to guilty pleas76 and rule
11(e)(4) of the federal rules of criminal procedure 77 to "require the
trial judge, who accepts a plea but rejects any other portion of the
plea bargain, to afford the defendant the opportunity to withdraw
'78
his guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty.
The Montana court has cited and approved the United States
Supreme Court holding in Santobello v. New York 79 that when a
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
(1974).
77.
78.
79.
State v.

, 658 P.2d 372 (1983).
§ 46-16-105(1)(b) (1983).
- Mont. at , 673 P.2d at 484.
Id. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202 (1983).
Cavanaugh, - Mont. at , 673 P.2d at 485.
Id. at , 673 P.2d at 484.
-

Mont.

-

MONT. CODE ANN.

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§§ 3.3(b), 4.1(c)

FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e)(4).

Cavanaugh, Mont. at -, 673 P.2d at 485.
404 U.S. 257 (1971). See, e.g., State v. Allen, Mont. , 645 P.2d 380 (1981);
Brown, Mont. -, 629 P.2d 777 (1981); State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481,
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defendant enters a plea of guilty in exchange for a prosecutor's
sentence recommendation and the prosecutor does not abide by
the agreement, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw his
plea. In State v. Dinndor8 0 the defendant had an oral agreement
with the county attorney for no sentence recommendation in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. At the hearing to enter the
plea, the county attorney recommended a ten-year sentence, in violation of his previous agreement. The district court sentenced the
defendant, over his counsel's objections, in accordance with the
county attorney's recommendation. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea on the basis that the parties
had not followed that court's procedure, which required that a plea
bargain be placed on the record."1 Specifically repudiating a Second Circuit holding that "off the record" promises of a prosecutor
are a nullity and unenforceable in light of state policy to recognize
only those pleas on the record, 2 the Montana Supreme Court held,
in accordance with Santobello, that oral plea agreements are enforceable under general contract principles and that the defendant
should have been allowed to withdraw his plea if the agreement
was breached."8
VI.

"OTHER CRIMES" EVIDENCE

As in other jurisdictions, in Montana evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by a person is inadmissible to show the
character of that person and that he acted in conformity with his
character.8 4 "Other crimes" evidence, however, is admissible to
prove a specific contested issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, plan or preparation, knowledge, or identity. 5 In State v.
Just,6 a 1979 case, the supreme court held that as a prerequisite
to admitting evidence of other crimes the trial court must consider:
608 P.2d 428 (1980).
80. Mont. -, 658 P.2d 372 (1983).
81. Id. at , 658 P.2d at 373. District court policy in the 18th Judicial District was
that attorneys from both sides and the defendant should meet with the court reporter and
enter the plea bargain on the record. There was no record in this case.
82. Siegel v. State, 691 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. Dinndorf, Mont. at , 658 P.2d at 374. Practitioners should also note
Hanson v. Risley, F. Supp. , 40 St. Rptr. 2100 (D. Mont. 1983), in which the
federal district court held that admissions during the negotiation of a guilty plea later withdrawn were not admissible for impeachment purposes where they were induced by promises
of leniency. MONT. R. EviD. 410 provides that on the record admissions in withdrawn guilty
pleas may be used for impeachment.
84. MONT. R. Evi. 404(b).
85. Id. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631 (1969).
86. 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 (1979).
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(1) similarity of the crimes or acts; (2) nearness in time; (3) tendency of the crimes or acts to establish a common scheme, plan, or
system; and (4) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. 87 The court also required a
strict notice procedure to inform a defendant of the state's intention to present evidence of other crimes.8" Two recent cases indicate that the Just standard may be eroding.
In State v. Smith"9 the defendant was convicted of burglary,
forgery, and solicitation for encouraging his accomplice to deliver
the forged checks. The series of criminal acts began in Spokane,
Washington, where the defendant and his accomplice stole purses
from which they obtained credit cards to use as identification. The
two then drove to Missoula where they stole blank payroll checks,
a check protector, and cash, and rented a typewriter they did not
return. After cashing the forged checks, they returned to Spokane.
On appeal, the defendant objected to the evidence of the purse
and typewriter thefts as other crimes evidence improperly admitted under the Just standard.90 The supreme court held that the
state did not need to meet the Just standard in this case. 9 1 Although not committed simultaneously with the crimes charged, the
court reasoned that the thefts of the purse and typewriter were not
wholly independent but were "inseparably related to the common
general scheme of the defendant to engage in [the criminal acts
charged]" and were "explanatory of his method and purpose."92
The court relied on an earlier case, 93 holding that the theft of
credit cards, which were in a truck at the time it was stolen by the
defendant, was inseparably related to the theft of the truck and,
therefore, was not excluded as other crimes evidence."
In State v. Gillham,95 the court considered a different aspect
of the admissibility of evidence of a series of acts leading up to an
offense. Convicted of attempted deliberate homicide, the defendant objected to evidence of both criminal and noncriminal acts as
being improperly admitted because it was other crimes evidence
subject to the notice provisions of Just. Again the court reasoned
87.

Id. at 268-69, 602 P.2d at 961.

88. Id.
89. Mont. , 670 P.2d 96 (1983).
90. Id. at
, 670 P.2d at 98.
91. Id. at
, 670 P.2d at 99.
92. Id.
93. State v. Trombley, Mont. -,
620 P.2d 367 (1980).
94. But see State v. Gray, Mont. , 643 P.2d 233 (1982) (holding that consecutive acts of vandalism on a single vehicle to defraud the insurer were not "inseparably
related").
95. Mont. -, 670 P.2d 544 (1983).
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that the Just requirements did not apply because none of the acts
were "wholly independent" and all were inseparably related to the
crime charged. The court also noted that the state is entitled to
present the entire corpus delicti of the crime, and that this rule
overrides the Just requirements. Because Gillham's acts provided
an explanatory context for the crime, they were admissible as part
of the corpus delicti as well.9 In a cautionary note, however, the
court urged that the Just rule be liberally applied to assure fairness and to protect the defendant from unfair surprise or double
punishment. 7
The problem with Smith and Gillham is that the court, by
finding that the acts were "inseparably related" to the crimes
charged, removed the evidence from the "other crimes" category,
but then ruled on the evidence's admissibility in the "other
crimes" terms of Just and rule 404(b).9 8 These cases leave unclear
whether the evidence was in fact not "other crimes" evidence and,
therefore, not subject to the Just standard, or whether the evidence was "other crimes" evidence admissible under new judicial
exceptions. The rulings are further complicated by the fact that in
holding that some series of acts are subject to the Just standard9 9
and that other similar series of acts are not,"'0 the court seemingly
has looked both ways in determining when a given act is "inseparably related" to the crime charged.

VII.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The state's right of appeal in criminal cases is narrowly defined by statute. 10 1 One instance in which appeal is allowed is when
a court order or judgment results in dismissal of a case. 102 If that
dismissal substantially effects an acquittal, however, the state may
not appeal, because of the double jeopardy protections of the federal and Montana Constitutions.'" An acquittal is a court's ruling
that amounts to a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the
factual issues connected with the offense charged.10 4 In State v.
96. Id. at -,
670 P.2d at 549-50.
97. Id. at -,
670 P.2d at 550.
98. MONT. R. EviD. 404(b).
99. See supra note 94.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-103 (1983).
102. Id. § 46-20-103(2)(a).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 25. See State v. Hagerud, 174
Mont. 361, 366-67, 570 P.2d 1131, 1134-35 (1977).
104. See State v. Cool, 174 Mont. 99, 101, 568 P.2d 567, 568 (1977).
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Greenwalt'0 5 the court addressed the question whether a dismissal
for insufficient evidence constitutes an acquittal.
The defendants in Greenwalt were charged with the theft of
several calves, most belonging to non-Indians living on the Crow
reservation. One calf, however, belonged to an enrolled member of
the Crow tribe. The court dismissed the count relating to the theft
of the Indian's calf, on the ground that the state has no jurisdiction to prosecute a non-Indian for an offense against an Indian in
Indian country. The defendants moved for dismissal of the remaining charges against them, based on the assertion that the state
could not present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's unauthorized control of the calves for more than seventy-two hours
as required by statute. 106 The motion was granted and the charges
were dismissed. The state appealed the dismissal.
The supreme court held that the dismissal for insufficient evidence did effectively resolve the factual issues connected with the
offense charged and was, therefore, an acquittal protected from appeal by the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition.10 7 The
court, however, specifically excluded the theft of the Indian's calf
from this holding, notwithstanding identical factual circumstances,
because that count had been dismissed on jurisdictional rather
than factual grounds. 0 8
In addition to protecting defendants from multiple prosecutions for a single offense, the double jeopardy prohibition protects
defendants from multiple punishments for one offense. 0 9 In State
v. Wells'" the defendant challenged his convictions and separate
sentences for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and attempted sexual intercourse without consent, asserting that the offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault were merged
and that his conviction for each was double jeopardy."' The defendant had attacked a twelve-year-old girl, who was sleeping in her
grandparents' home. In the course of the attack defendant choked
the girl, hit her on the head with the handle of his knife causing
her to lose consciousness, and stabbed her in the back six times. In
challenging the convictions, the defendant argued that his use of
105. Mont. -,
663 P.2d 1178 (1983).
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-217(1) (1981) (amended 1983). The current statute requires unauthorized control for 24 hours.
107. Greenwalt, Mont. at -, 663 P.2d at 1181.
108. Id. at -,
663 P.2d at 1181-82.
109. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969); Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); State v. Close,
- Mont.
-, 623 P.2d 940, 949 (1981).
110.
- Mont. -,
658 P.2d 381 (1983).
111. Id. at -, 658 P.2d at 388.
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the knife was the same aggravating factor in each offense.
Using a Blockburger" analysis, the supreme court reaffirmed
the rule that where the same act or transaction is a violation of two
separate statutes, the determination of whether there are two offenses or one turns on whether each statute requires the proof of a
fact not required by the other."' This analysis must be based on
the requirements of the statutes, and not on the facts of the individual case." 4
Stating that historically it has consistently regarded burglary
as an offense distinct from any other offense, the court looked at
the statutes and held that the offenses of aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault were not merged." 5 The court then analyzed
the determinative elements of each offense in relation to the facts
of this case. The elements of aggravated burglary" 6 are the entry
and unlawful remaining in an occupied structure, an intent to commit some other felony while in the occupied structure, and the infliction of bodily injury on another person. For aggravated assault" 7 the elements are the infliction of bodily injury on someone
with a weapon, or the creation of reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury with a weapon. Each offense requires proof of a
factual element not required by the other.
The court next considered whether the defendant's use of a
knife was a common factor raising both offenses to the aggravated
level. It found that the defendant committed the aggravated burglary when he entered and remained unlawfully in the girl's room
with the intent to commit aggravated assault and injured her by
choking and knocking her out. He committed aggravated assault
either by stabbing the girl or threatenihg her with the knife. Because the defendant's use of the knife was not necessarily the aggravating factor in each offense, and the offenses of aggravated
burglary and aggravated assault were not merged, the court held
that this defendant had not been placed in double jeopardy." 8
VIII.

SENTENCING

Sentencing is, to the defendant at least, one of the most criti112. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
113. Wells, __
Mont. at , 658 P.2d at 388-89.
114. State v. Ritchson, Mont. , 630 P.2d 234, 237 (1981); State v. Close, Mont. -, 623 P.2d 940, 950 (1981). See also Survey, CriminalProcedure,MONT. L. Rv.
279, 291-94 (1982).
115. Wells, Mont. at , 658 P.2d at 389.
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204(2) (1983).
117. Id. § 45-5-202.
118. Wells, __
Mont. at -,
658 P.2d at 388, 391.
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cal stages of the criminal process. Rehabilitation is a chief aim of
the state in its correctional policy," 9 one that requires very individualized evaluation of defendants prior to sentencing. State v.
Bolt 10 and State v. Redding"' illustrate some of the difficulties
encountered in reconciling legislative policy and defendants' rights.
When a defendant twenty-one years of age or younger receives
his first conviction for criminal possession of dangerous drugs, he is
presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence.1 2 In
Bolt the court interpreted the application of this presumption to a
youth convicted for the first time of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, but who had been previously convicted for nondrug-related felonies. The defendant, twenty years old, was convicted for
possession of dangerous drugs while serving concurrent five-year
sentences for burglary and criminal mischief. The trial court concluded that the defendant's prior felony convictions overrode the
presumption '2 and did not defer imposition of the sentence for
24
the drug offense.
The supreme court, on appeal, looked to the purpose of the
statute, which was to prevent ruining the future of a young offender, and concluded that that benefit could not be realized in the
face of prior felony convictions. 12 The presumption is a disputable
one and may be overcome by other evidence. 126 The court adopted
the standards set out in an earlier case' 27 to determine the sufficiency of evidence required to overcome the statutory presumption: (1) the record must disclose the evidence, (2) the evidence
may be within or outside the proof of the crime, (3) the aggravating circumstances should be substantial evidence over and above
the prima facie case, and (4) there must be hearings and a record
disclosing the aggravating evidence in the absence of a voluntary
waiver. 12
The evidence in Bolt met this standard. The record disclosed
that the defendant was an inmate at the Swan River Youth Forest
Camp following felony convictions, thus satisfying factors (1) and
(2). The confinement of the defendant at the time of the drug of119.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101 (1983).

120.
121.

-

122.
123.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(5) (1983).
Id.

124.

__

-

Mont.
Mont.

-,

Mont. at -,

664 P.2d 322 (1983).
, 675 P.2d 974 (1984).

664 P.2d at 323.

125. Id. at -,
664 P.2d at 324.
126. See State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 291, 462 P.2d 873, 876 (1969).
127. Campus v. State, 157 Mont. 321, 483 P.2d 275 (1971).
128. Bolt, - Mont. at -,
664 P.2d at 324 (citing Campus, 157 Mont. at 327, 483
P.2d at 279).
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fense was an aggravating circumstance sufficient to satisfy factor
(3). In satisfaction of factor (4), the court found that the defendant
had an opportunity to rebut the evidence presented at his sentencing hearing and had failed to do so. The court, emphasizing that
prior offenses need not be drug-related, held that the criteria were
satisifed and affirmed the sentence of the trial court."' 9
The rule that judges may not consider out-of-court information in sentencing a defendant is well-established. 130 State v. Redding 3 ' sets a new standard for determining the undisclosed information that may not be considered in sentencing a defendant. In
Redding the defendant was convicted of auto theft. Prior to sentencing, in a private conference with the probation officer who prepared the defendant's presentence report, the trial judge learned
that the defendant had been involved in "problems with other
cars" while awaiting sentencing. During the actual sentencing the
judge indicated he knew of and had considered these other
"problems" in arriving at the defendant's sentence.
On appeal, the court held that a district judge may not consider any undisclosed information revealed in a private conference
with the presentence investigating officer prior to sentencing. 32
The court based its holding on its own prior rulings that a judge
may not sentence based on private out-of-court information, 3 on
due process guarantees of the federal and Montana Constitutions,
and on fundamental fairness ideals embodied in the adversarial
system. The new standard, to be applied prospectively, provides
that any derogatory information that affects the defendant's interests should be called to the attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others acting on his behalf. 34

129.
- Mont. at , 664 P.2d at 325.
130. See, e.g., State v. Baker, Mont. -,
667 P.2d 416 (1983); State v. Stewart,
175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138 (1977); State v. Osborn, 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509 (1979);
Kuhl v. Dist. Court, 139 Mont. 536, 366 P.2d 347 (1961).
131. Mont. , 675 P.2d 974 (1984).
132. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 976.
133. See supra note 130.
134. Redding, - Mont. at -, 675 P.2d at 976. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Gulbrandson charged the majority with impliedly ruling MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-113 (1983)
unconstitutional without referring to its outlined procedures. Noting the court's statement
in Stewart, 175 Mont. at 305-06, 573 P.2d at 1149, that "rigid adherence to restrictive rules
of evidence properly applicable at trial" should not be required in sentencing hearings, Justice Gulbrandson asserted that this restriction on presentence information likely would deprive some defendants of the individualized punishment that is the aim of Montana's sentencing statutes. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-101(2) (1983).
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